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AN OVERT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT FOR 
ELIMINATING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Joshua Fershée* 
I’m Josh Fershée from the West Virginia University College of  
Law, and I am really sorry that I can’t be there with you today.  Some things 
got in the way, and there was just no way for me to make the trip, so I’m 
really sorry to miss out on this.  This is one of  my favorite things to do.  
Business Law Prof  Blog1 is an important part of  my weekly life, and the 
colleagues and friends that I’ve made through that process have helped me 
both from a friendship perspective and from a scholarly and professional 
perspective.  So I’m sorry to miss everything.  I had a great experience last 
year at the University of  Tennessee and working with the Transactions 
journal folks.  So thank you for having me.  Thank you for all of  your 
efforts and, again, I’m sorry I can’t be there with you.  
I’ll talk a little bit about some things that are near and dear to my 
heart—the limited liability company (LLC).  Anybody who’s read my blog 
knows that it is important to me that people recognize the difference 
between a corporation and a limited liability company and, particularly, not 
call an LLC a limited liability corporation.2  This is important to me, in 
part, because of  the simple obligation to get things right.  But also because 
I view the LLC as a special and unique entity, and I think it has real value 
as a unique and integral part of  the current entity options for people in 
business and moving forward.  
I like to recommend that people focus on what it is to be an LLC, 
and not just view it as simply a partnership with the limited liability 
benefits of  a corporation, or functionally a corporation with pass-through 
tax status.  I think it’s more than that, although it is all of  those things, and 
there’s no question that the value to the LLC really is that pass through tax 
status opportunity that lets people kind of  [adopt] the traditional 
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2 See, e.g., Joshua Fershee, An LLC Checklist Proposal, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: 
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partnership structure if  they so choose.  Really, the beauty of  the LLC, 
and why I see it as so important [and] distinct from the other entities, is 
the flexibility.  It really can be all of  the things that you want it to be in 
terms of  an entity.  You can pick and choose from the whole buffet of  
entity options, and you can have [a] publicly traded LLC really [end] up 
being [a] publicly traded partnership but have the functional obligation or 
a master limited partnership that looks like that process.  We have all these 
entities that give us flexibility.  And, so, without going into too much of  a 
deep dive with those because that’s really not the focus, I really just want 
to make sure that we’re clear that we’re talking about limited liability 
companies as my primary focus.   
It’s well established that in Delaware, particularly, [that] the LLC is 
viewed as a “creature[] of  contract,” that the operating agreement is really 
what defines the entity, and that the LLC statute gives a broad latitude to 
anybody creating their LLC.3 So one of  the things Delaware has done as 
a leader in this area—much to the chagrin of  some and the pleasure of  
others—is to be very creative in allowing people to create an LLC, create 
an entity, that reflects what they want.  
One of  the big things, and the focus for me today, is the flexibility 
with regard to fiduciary obligations and fiduciary duties.4  That is, the 
ability to essentially disclaim or eliminate all fiduciary duties, including the 
duty of  care and the duty of  loyalty.5  Now, in Delaware, of  course, it 
                                                             
3 Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., LLC, 971 A.2d 872, 880 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Limited liability 
companies are creatures of  contract, and the parties have broad discretion to use an LLC 
agreement to define the character of  the company and the rights and obligations of  its 
members.”). But see In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 605 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“[T]he 
purely contractarian view discounts core attributes of  the LLC that only the sovereign 
can authorize, such as its separate legal existence, potentially perpetual life, and limited 
liability for its members.” (citing 6 Del. C. §§ 18–201, 18–303)).  
4 This paper and presentation are based on a blog post from 2016.  Joshua Fershee, 
Embracing Freedom of  Contract in the LLC: Linking the Lack of  Duty of  Loyalty to a Duty of  
Disclosure, L. Professor Blogs Network: Bus. L. Prof. Blog (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/02/i-have-been-giving-a-lot-of 
-thought-to-the-idea-of-waiving-the-duty-of-loyalty-in-llcs-in-delaware-the-more-i-think 
-about-it.html.  
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (2013) provides: 
A limited liability company agreement may provide for the limitation 
or elimination of  any and all liabilities for breach of  contract and 
breach of  duties (including fiduciary duties) of  a member, manager or 
other person to a limited liability company or to another member or 
manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound 
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always remains that the contractual duty of  good faith and fair dealing 
applies to all LLCs, and that’s something that cannot be disclaimed.6 But 
the traditional fiduciary duties, particularly looking at the duty of  loyalty, 
can be eliminated if  done so expressly.  As someone who believes in 
freedom of  contract and is comfortable where we have parties, at least on 
the front end, negotiating for what they want, I don’t have a problem with 
that.  I think that it’s good to have options as long as everybody’s clear 
what those options are.  
The main thing I want to focus on today is thinking about that 
concept of  the fiduciary duty and eliminating the fiduciary duty and what 
that could mean for future parties.  [When] parties A and B get together 
to create an LLC, if  they negotiate to eliminate their fiduciary agreements 
as to one another, I’m completely comfortable with that.  They are 
negotiating for what they want; they are entering into that entity and 
operating agreement together of  their own free will.  So there may be 
differences in bargaining power—one may be wealthier than the other or 
have different kinds of  power dynamics—but they are entering into this 
agreement fully aware [of] what the obligations are and what the options 
are for somebody in creating this entity.  
My concern with eliminating fiduciary obligations comes down 
the road.  That is, how do we make sure that if  people are going to disclaim 
the fiduciary duty of  loyalty particularly, what happens if  this change is 
made after the fact?  And that’s where I do like to look at our traditional 
partnership law which says there are certain kinds of  decisions, at least 
absent an agreement to the contrary, that have to go to the entire group.7  
That is, a majority vote is not sufficient; there is essentially a minority veto.8  
                                                             
by a limited liability company agreement; provided, that a limited 
liability company agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any 
act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of  the implied 
contractual covenant of  good faith and fair dealing. 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Paciaroni v. Crane, 408 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. Ch. 1979) (determining that a dispute 
among partners that did not arise “in the ordinary course of  partnership business” 
requires unanimity and cannot be decided by majority vote, absent agreement otherwise); 
see also Rev. Uniform Partnership Act § 401(j) (2018–2019 ed.) (“A difference arising as 
to a matter in the ordinary course of  business of  a partnership may be decided by a 
majority of  the partners.  An act outside the ordinary course of  business of  a partnership 
and an amendment to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the 
consent of  all of  the partners.”). 
8 See Rev. Uniform Partnership Act § 401(j). 
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And when it comes to eliminating fiduciary duties, I think that would be 
appropriate for LLCs.  
So, in Delaware where we’re allowed to eliminate the fiduciary 
duties by agreement, as long as we do so expressly, it would be appropriate 
to me for Delaware to adopt a requirement that, to change or eliminate a 
fiduciary duty, there must be agreement of  all parties or an express and 
clear statement as to what it requires to change that.  That is, if  at the 
beginning of  the entity when you create it, you say, “we are not disclaiming 
our fiduciary duty of  loyalty,” for example, “at this point, but we reserve 
the right to do so in the future with a majority vote.” That should be 
expressly stated.  That is, one can’t just say, “This operating agreement can 
be modified or changed via majority vote.”  [Instead,] when it comes to 
fiduciary duties, it must be stated expressly what that change require[s].  
This is because traditional fiduciary duties of  care and loyalty are 
so ingrained in our concept of  entities and those involved with fiduciary 
obligations that we expect people to have them.  In fact, when Delaware 
looked at this before it was codified, Delaware looked at the statute and 
said the LLC statute was silent as to whether there was a requirement for 
fiduciary duties, and the Delaware court said, “Of  course there is.  There 
is an expectation with entities as a general matter [that] we are going to see 
fiduciary duties and fiduciary obligations, so this makes sense to us that 
this would be there.”9  They went on to clarify [that in the statute], 
however, if  one chooses to have an entity that disclaims fiduciary duties, 
one may do so expressly, but you must do so expressly.10  You don’t need 
to create a fiduciary duty in the operating agreement; [ fiduciary duties] 
                                                             
9 Kelly v. Blum, No. CIV.A. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) 
(“Delaware cases interpreting Section 18-1101(c) have concluded that, despite the wide 
latitude of  freedom of  contract afforded to contracting parties in the LLC context, ‘in 
the absence of  a contrary provision in the LLC agreement,’ LLC managers and members 
owe ‘traditional fiduciary duties of  loyalty and care’ to each other and to the company.”). 
10 Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 661 (Del. Ch. 2012) “[T]he Delaware Limited 
Liability Company Act (the ‘LLC Act’) contemplates that equitable fiduciary duties will 
apply by default to a manager or managing member of  a Delaware LLC.”); see also Auriga 
Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 858 (Del. Ch.), judgment entered sub nom. 
Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC (Del. Ch. 2012), aff ’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 
2012) (finding  the member conduct was “governed by traditional fiduciary duties of  
loyalty and care because the LLC Agreement does not alter them”).   
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exist and apply unless one modifies or changes them, which was consistent 
with the statutory language.11  
Then the question comes—, if  we are going to allow someone to 
eliminate fiduciary duties at the outset, why not be able to do it later? Well, 
I think the same rationale applies—that is, when you enter into an LLC, 
the expectation of  fiduciary duties [applies] unless they’ve been removed.  
And if, when you enter the LLC, the fiduciary duties are there, then one 
has a reasonable expectation that those are going to remain unless 
modified.  Some will say you know going in that you can modify or 
eliminate fiduciary duties, and the fact that it’s a Delaware LLC, alone, puts 
you on notice.  I think because of  how ingrained fiduciary duties are, the 
concept of  them, that that’s not sufficient.  That’s not consistent with what 
we would expect within a majoritarian bargain.  
In doing so, my proposal would be this—to build on the concept 
of  elimination of  fiduciary duties in Delaware.  Traditionally the fiduciary 
duty in Delaware statute says that if  you want to eliminate fiduciary duties 
in Delaware, you must do so explicitly and clearly and state exactly what it 
is you’re doing—a statement to the effect of  ”we expressly disclaim and 
eliminate all fiduciary duties to the extent permissible by law.”  So, if  you 
want to do that in the future, I think there should be a similar statement—
“we reserve the right to eliminate fiduciary duties down the road by a 
majority vote.”  
We’ve seen, in history of  entity law, various opportunities where 
anything can be changed by majority vote.  Therefore, you’re on notice of  
that change.  Even when we look back on those cases, that was before the 
opportunity to eliminate fiduciary duties was available.  That is, the ability 
to eliminate fiduciary duties is a relatively new concept, and so I think it 
requires heightened awareness and heightened notice to allow this.  On 
the flip side, I think that providing heightened notice and heightened 
awareness to that happening or the possibility that it could happen or 
might happen in a particular entity gives more support to the idea that you 
should be able to eliminate those duties.  That is what is critical to this—
this freedom to contract is the freedom to decide and do what it is that 
you think is best for the entity and best for your agreement without 
blindsiding or surprising people with new iterations [modifying] long-held 
beliefs.  
This really goes to the idea of  why it is so important to me that 
people recognize LLCs as unique entities.  We should be looking at the 
LLC as something that has more flexibility, that you should be on notice 
                                                             
11 See Feeley, 62 A.3d at 661. 
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when you work with an LLC.  For example, that there may be the abilities 
to change things that if  you had a partnership or you had a corporation 
wouldn’t even be available by statute.  That, I think, is a good thing.  It has 
value in the LLC.  
Unfortunately, the carelessness with which many courts have 
treated LLCs, and many practitioners for that matter, ha[s] led us to believe 
that they really are just a hybrid and they aren’t unique.  You’re just pulling 
from one [entity form] or the other.  So if  your LLC is structured largely 
like a partnership, then we should just probably pull from the partnership 
rule.  And if  it’s structured and looks largely like a corporation—you’ve 
structured with a manager-managed LLC that looks like a board [with] a 
similar concentrated decision making structure—[then] we should treat it 
like a corporation.  And for any of  these different pieces that are moving, 
we’ll just look to see which one it looks more like.  
There’s certainly value from being able to pull from other case law 
and other entity law, to say, “this is really similar.”  I’ve argued in a number 
of  places that courts, in fact, are fine to do that.  They simply should say, 
“we’re doing it.  We are applying this corporate law concept to LLCs for 
this reason.  We are extending this partnership doctrine to LLC or applying 
it in this case for this particular reason instead of  simply saying that this is 
an LLC, and therefore it looks like something else so we’ll just adopt it.”  
This is particularly problematic to me in the corporate context.  
What we see is corporation law being applied to limited liability 
companies.  Almost 6,000 different court cases have referred to the limited 
liability company as a limited liability corporation and just adopted 
wholesale, at least in their particular context, the corporate law and applied 
it without any explanation as to why that’s the right application.  That 
brings us back to the fiduciary duties and the fiduciary duty problems.  
The other part of  this that I’d like to talk about is what the real 
value is in being able to disclaim fiduciary duties overall.  If  you look at a 
number of  different businesses and business structures, we already have a 
whole host of  businesses that are looking to narrow the scope of  their 
fields.  Traditionally, you go back to Meinhard v. Salmon  and what was the 
scope of  the partnership is functionally the question.12  In Meinhard v. 
Salmon, the question for the 20-year hotel lease, the question is, was it 
related to the business of  running that particular hotel?  It was a 20-year 
                                                             
12 See  249 N.Y. 458, 477, 164 N.E. 545, 552 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“What then 
was the scope of  the adventure into which the two men entered?”).  
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term, so as the lease occurred, they were partners together, and [the] 
partnership was going to end at the end of  it.  Was it the idea of  running 
a partnership to run a hotel?  Could it extend to other kinds of  hotels? 
What was the scope of  that partnership?  In that case they didn’t really 
[say] it, and it wasn’t entirely clear what the intent was.13  
But in a variety of  areas, in particularly in property partnership and 
property LLC agreements, we do see an intent to very narrowly limit the 
scope.  That is, multiple different investors want to go into business with 
other different investors in potentially competing ventures.  We see this all 
the time.  We have long recognized in partnership law and early LLC law 
the ability to narrow the scope of  the partnership, to narrow the scope of  
the agreement, [and] to narrow the scope of  what those fiduciary 
obligations are.  And that’s okay.  That’s not problematic.  The reality is we 
often don’t do a very good job of  explicitly disclaiming that [duty] because 
we weren’t allowed to.14  That is, “I intend to deal with you in this particular 
property venture —this other business endeavor— but I intend to 
compete with you in vigorous ways in all other areas.”  It’s a way, perhaps, 
of  diversifying one’s portfolio, perhaps getting in on a particular 
investment that they wanted to without having to give up their other 
investments.  These are really important opportunities and we’ve seen 
them for literally decades, if  not hundreds of  years, the opportunity to 
engage in these different kinds of  ventures.  But we weren’t able to really 
say, “I’m intending to compete as hard as I can with you.”  
My only limit here, even when I vote in my own self-interest, even 
in this particular endeavor, I intend to be competing with you and looking 
out for myself  and seeking more.  In many ways this is permitted, as long 
as you didn’t violate certain norms.  Those norms remain and that’s why I 
think Delaware’s actually done a really good job of  providing, in a 
statutory way, the ability to recognize business arrangements and business 
agreements that have been going on for a long time; and should be 
recognized after the fact, after there’s a dispute, that the intent of  the 
parties was to compete vigorously, that the limit of  their agreement was 
[to] pursue profit together in a particular venture within the confines of  a 
very narrow scope.  The duty of  good faith and fair dealing is implied in 
the contract.  What have we basically agreed to one another to enter this 
contract at all?  Does this contract have any value or make any sense with 
                                                             
13 See id. at 548. 
14 In fact, in most places beyond Delaware, it remains the case that one cannot eliminate 
the fiduciary duty of  loyalty; one can only “identify specific types or categories of 
activities that do not violate the duty of  loyalty, if  not manifestly unreasonable.”  See Unif. 
Ltd. Liability Co. Act § 103 (1996).  
986 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20 
 
  
this particular outcome?  If  the answer is yes, that’s sufficient.  We don’t 
need to run it back through what the fiduciary obligations were because 
we said there weren’t any.  We never intended to have any.  And at various 
times, we can see that in some of  the early cases.  
I think that’s a real value that Delaware is adding: being able to 
create contracts that recognize the practical reality of  what businesses have 
been doing for a long time.  And not providing an avenue for the party 
who, in essence loses—that doesn’t do as well, doesn’t compete as well—
to have a second bite at the apple.  Where the deal the whole time really 
was intended to provide an opportunity for profit for both of  them, for 
all of  the members to compete vigorously.  
We see this if  you look at some of  the sports cases, where people 
were looking to purchase sports teams with the idea that you might want 
to get in with three or four different ventures.  Your primary goal is to be 
the resulting winner who ends up with the athletic team.15  So you might 
want to be able to participate with Venture A and Venture B and Venture 
C, not really caring who wins it as long as you’re on the team that wins.  
As long as everybody who is engaging in the endeavor understands that’s 
the intent, well that’s practical, that’s reasonable, and that’s understandable.  
And there are limits, perhaps, that we would place on one another of  what 
you can do in the process, but maybe we have to do that by saying we don’t 
have any fiduciary obligations to one another, that the answer is that we 
have to be careful about [what] we share, in terms of  our information.  Or 
we limit who has access to information that could be used to further a 
competing venture, because the whole point of  being an investor and 
being part of  the team was to win.  
 Some might say that this is better done by separating it out.  [That] 
if  you want to be an investor and don’t want fiduciary dut[ies], you can’t 
have any control or any input.  That certainly works in the corporate 
context, right? I can own stock in Microsoft and Apple and Ford and 
General Motors and that’s not problematic.  I don’t have any control.  I 
don’t have fiduciary obligations.  But when we talk about concentrated 
opportunities, particularly in things like property law or in the sports-team 
example that I just discussed, you want to have control or some level of  
input that is higher than that of  mere investor.  You want to be a 
                                                             
15 See, e.g., McConnell v. Hunt Sports Ent., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1206 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 
1999) (stating the the operating agreement was “plain and unambiguous and allowed 
members” of  CHL, and LLC created to secure an NHL franchise, “to compete against 
CHL for an NHL franchise”).  
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participant to some degree.  Why should we not be able to contract to 
make that happen? In fact, by creating that opportunity, creating that 
obligation to one another that is limited and clearly laid out, [it] seems to 
me to have real value and create opportunity for proper kinds of  risk 
taking and potentially growing the size of  the pie.  
 That brings us back to the rationale as to why we should be allowed 
to do this and why we should also have protections to make sure 
everybody knows what those limitations are.  If, going back to the sports 
example, we are going to look at working with a group of  people for a 
sports group.  If  it is intended that the group will not compete with one 
another—that this is a closed group that is going to compete with outside 
groups—we want fiduciary duties to be available there.  What we might 
not want is the ability for somebody in that group or the majority of  that 
group to change it.  That is, to change and eliminate fiduciary duties that 
were there at the time of  formation so that we protect all those that come 
into the agreement.  They know what the deal is up front and that it’s 
expressed because we’re dealing with fiduciary duties.  This isn’t even just 
voting rights. This isn’t some of  the other areas.  We have more of  a caveat 
emptor relationship.  
 I recognize that this is a line-drawing exercise and some people 
would say that, “this is just like the other cases, so why would you have to 
put them on notice?”  I would simply say, “because fiduciary duties have 
historically been different.”  And, in fact, Delaware had to go through a 
history of  saying, “Yes, there are fiduciary duties in there and if  you want 
to take them out you have to be very express in eliminating them.”  There 
is a way in which you do that.  It seems to me proper to say that, when we 
deal with fiduciary duties and fiduciary duty changes, not only do you have 
to expressly limit or expressly eliminate them in your operating agreement 
when you do so, but if  you intend to have the ability to do so later, you 
also need to put them on notice.  That is, people should know what they’re 
getting into and this seems to me to balance their rights and obligations 
that one would expect in terms of  fiduciary duties with the right to create 
the entity that one thinks is very best for their opportunities.16  
                                                             
16 In Tennessse, majority members of  an LLC “stand[] in a fiduciary relationship to the 
minority, similar to the Supreme Court’s teaching . . . regarding a corporation . . . . Such 
a holding does not conflict with the statute, and is in keeping with the statutory 
requirement that each LLC member discharge all of  his or her duties in good faith.”  
Anderson v. Wilder, E200300460COAR3CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (Tenn. App. Nov. 
21, 2003).  The Anderson opinion, I will note incorrectly refers to a “majority shareholder 
of  an LLC” rather than a majority member, but the point still holds.  Id. 
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Now, ultimately, this is challenging, but this is consistent with 
views that I’ve had in other places.  My view of, if  you go back to early 
corporate law for example, to Dodge v. Ford.  If  you look at Dodge v. Ford, 
my view of  that case is not just that Henry Ford decided to run a 
philanthropic institution, notwithstanding the way the opinion’s written, 
but that he changed course.17  That is, for years profit was flowing in, 
shareholders were being paid with major dividends, and everybody who 
was participating in the entity was getting wealthy.  And then one day he 
decided to change.18  Henry Ford decided to change that.  In fact, he got 
on the stand and said “I’d like to change that.  I’ve decided I’ve done 
enough, you’ve had enough.”  That’s a significant change in philosophy.  
It’s not just that you’re changing your view of  how things work, but you’re 
changing your view of  how the business operates and what people signed 
up for.  It goes beyond, it’s pushing beyond the business judgement rule 
in that context.19  
 Fast forward to Ebay v. Newmark, where we see a similar situation.20  
My view of  that [is], notwithstanding some of  the challenges and some of  
the behavior of  the craigslist owners and board members, that [eBay] had 
the opportunity [to negotiate change] when Ebay bought in.21  Ebay knew 
that craigslist was a modest operation.  They did not charge and had not 
monetized craigslist in any significant way. [eBay] bought in not because 
they were going to monetize it (or that they expected monetization), but 
[because] if, in fact, craigslist did monetize, they wanted to be there and 
have a piece of  the pie.  [eBay], in fact, reserved their right to compete.  
They had the opportunity to compete and reserved that right.22  To later 
                                                             
17 Joshua P. Fershee, The End of  Responsible Growth and Governance?: The Risks Posed by Social 
Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of  Director Primacy, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 367 
(2017) (“Henry Ford stated clearly that he was operating the business as he saw fit and 
that he was changing toward supporting philanthropic purposes.”).  
18 Dodge v. Ford., 170 N.W. 668, 683-84 (Mich. 1919). 
19 Fershee, supra note 17, at 370 (“In Dodge v. Ford, there seemed to be a change in the 
business model (and how the business was operated with regard to dividends) once the 
Dodge Brothers started thinking about competing.  All of  a sudden, Ford became 
concerned about community first.”). 
20 eBay Dom. Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
21 Fershee, supra note 17, at 369.  
22 eBay Dom. Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 6 (“eBay purchased its stake in craigslist in August 
2004 pursuant to the terms of  a stockholders’ agreement between Jim, Craig, craigslist, 
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complain and say “You’re running this as a philanthropic institution,” is 
improper.23  [I] say, “No, it’s not.  There’s nothing wrong in doing that. 
This is what you signed up for.”  
 Those cases—Dodge v. Ford and Newmark are favorites of  mine—
are not directly applicable other than to, say, imagine what you can do if  
you could eliminate those fiduciary obligations.  If  I can eliminate the 
fiduciary obligation to seek profit, shouldn’t it be allowed under Delaware 
law to run exactly as craigslist was operating as an LLC anyway?  I would 
argue the answer is yes—that we should be able to create the entity that 
we intended as long as everybody knows what they’re signing up for.  They 
know exactly what’s [happening] there.  So the question in craigslist would 
be: “when you invested in craigslist, did you expect them to monetize?  
Did they do things the way they were going to or the way intended to?”  
If  the answer is yes, they continued to operate their entity as they had 
before, you don’t get to complain about that.  They don’t have a fiduciary 
obligation to do anything different.  They’ve disclaimed that.  To the extent 
they go beyond that and take the whole value of  the contract—they violate 
that obligation of  good faith and fair dealing—then they might have 
crossed that line. 
 If  you go back to Ebay v. Newmark, one could even argue that they 
might have violated in that context.  That it was not the fiduciary duty or 
the obligation to seek profit, as Chancellor Chandler said, but, in fact, the 
obligation of  the failure there was that they didn’t even live up to the basic 
good faith and fair dealing contract they entered into in the first place.  
What I will leave you, in looking at this, is that, in essence, I’m of  the view 
that it is great to have freedom of  contract and expansive freedom of  
contract as long as everybody knows what the contract says.  With regard 
to fiduciary duties, it’s not just careful reading, but full disclosure of  
knowing that, for eliminating fiduciary duties, you have to say it expressly 
and explicitly.  If  you’re retaining the option to do so by less than a 
unanimous [or perhaps supermajority] vote, then you have to disclose that.  
Make it clear not only when you reduce or eliminate fiduciary 
responsibilities, but also that you might or could and are maintaining that 
right.  That seems to be the optimal way to know what you’re getting into 
while creating the freedom of  contract and freedom of  opportunity to 
craft the agreement and the entity that you’re really looking for.  
                                                             
and eBay that expressly permits eBay to compete with craigslist in the online classifieds 
arena.”). 
23 Fershee, supra note 17, at 373.  
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 So thanks very much for your time.  I look forward to feedback 
and finding out what others think about this concept and, again, I’m sorry 
I can’t be there. 
* * * 
 Addendum: The whole point of  this talk was to express that 
changes to fiduciary duties, whether it means expanding, restricting, or 
eliminating the duties, could be used in a predatory manner.  For example, 
a member with 25% of  the membership interests could join an LLC that 
has eliminated or greatly reduced the duty of  loyalty.  Suppose that the 
Member A has competing ventures, but decided it was acceptable to join 
the LLC because she didn’t have any conflict of  interest concerns given 
the then-existing relaxed fiduciary-duty clauses.  If  the majority members 
decided to change the fiduciary duty clause to reinstate the duty of  loyalty, 
it’s possible that Member A could be forced to sell her interests or face a 
breach of  fiduciary duty claim.24  
 The duty of  good faith and fair dealing25 would seem to require 
that Member A receive fair value for her interests.26  Still, the change in 
                                                             
24 Cf. Benjamin P. Edwards, “Conflicts, Confidentiality, and Other Concerns: The 
Promise and Peril for Lawyers Serving on Corporate Boards,” 64 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 
3-1, 3-22 (2018).  Prof. Edwards provides a relevant example when he explains that, when 
a lawyer also serving as a director or LLC member “does not have a fiduciary duty to the 
entity, there may not be a significant risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent her client 
will be materially limited by her obligations to the entity.”  Id. (citing Model Rules of  
Professional Conduct 1.7(a)).  However, if  the entity were to reinstate or modify a 
fiduciary duty, it could create conflicts that did not exist prior to the modification.   
25 Where an LLC’s managers choose to exercise a right specifically provided, that exercise 
cannot be deemed bad faith. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010). However, 
where one uses powers and discretion granted under an operating agreement, one still 
must use that discretion in good faith. Bay Center Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery 
Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 WL 1124451 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).  There are those who read 
Nemec to suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court man not “permit a claim based on 
the implied covenant [of  good faith and fair dealing] if  the parties expressly bargained 
that management has sole discretion to determine how to operate the LLC.”  See Lewis 
H. Lazarus, Delaware LLC’s and the Implied Covenant of  Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
ABA: Bus. L. Today, (June 29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
business_law/publications/blt/2011/11/03_lazarus/.  That is an overly broad reading. 
In Nemec, “the contract authorize[d] the Company to act exactly as it did . . . .” Nemec, 991 
A.2d at 1126.  That is different than changing a fiduciary duty so that one can then take 
an opportunity not expressly provided (and contrary to) the original agreement.  
26 See Gottsacker v. Monnier, 697 N.W.2d 436, 438 (Wis. 2005) (determining that LLC 
members, even when they have “a material conflict of  interest,” are not prohibited “from 
voting to make the transfer [to exclude another member] so long as they dealt fairly”); 
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fiduciary duty could be used to force a buyout that had not been otherwise 
negotiated.  Additionally, there is authority in Delaware holding that an 
LLC’s managers are “required to carry out [their] functions in good faith, 
meaning [managers] could not engage in ‘arbitrary or unreasonable 
conduct’ that had the effect of  preventing [the minority LLC member] 
from ‘receiving the fruits of  the bargain.’”27  Chancellor Strine explained 
that, like in the corporate context, “proper performance of  their 
contractual obligations is to use the discretion granted to them in the 
company's organizational documents in good faith.”28 
 As such, I am arguing that the Delaware (and other states allowing 
reduction/elimination of  the duty of  loyalty) should require an express 
statement of  the fiduciary duties (when modified from the default29) and 
an express statement of  how those duties can be modified, whether 
expanding, restricting, or eliminating the duties.30  To protect against the 
predatory modification of  fiduciary duties, I believe that states should 
include a statutory requirement that changes to fiduciary duties must be 
express.  Some states have similar provisions in partnership law.  Maryland, 
for example, provides:  
(b) The partnership agreement may not: 
. . . . 
(3) Eliminate the duty of  loyalty under § 9A-404(b) or § 
9A-603(b)(3) of  this title, but: 
                                                             
Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (“A partner may not . . . by use of  adverse 
pressure ‘freeze out’ a co-partner and appropriate the business to his own use . . .  unless 
he fully compensates his co-partner for his share of  the prospective business 
opportunity.”). 
27 Bay Center Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 WL 1124451 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 20, 2009). 
28 Id. (emphasis added). 
29 Absent modification, fiduciary duties apply to a manager or managing member of  an 
LLC.  See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 661 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[T]he Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act (the ‘LLC Act’) contemplates that equitable fiduciary 
duties will apply by default to a manager or managing member of  a Delaware LLC.”). 
30 This would codify what is already the case under Delaware law. Kelly v. Blum, CIV.A. 
4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).  (“[D]espite the wide latitude 
of  freedom of  contract afforded to contracting parties in the LLC context, ‘in the 
absence of  a contrary provision in the LLC agreement,’ LLC managers and members 
owe ‘traditional fiduciary duties of  loyalty and care’ to each other and to the company.”); 
see also In re Nantucket Island Associates Ltd. Partnership Unitholders Litigation, 810 
A.2d 351 (Del. Ch. 2002) (finding that fundamental changes to limited partnership 
interests should be expressly stated or else require unanimous consent). 
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(i) The partnership agreement may identify specific types 
or categories of  activities that do not violate the duty of  
loyalty; however, the partnership agreement may not be 
amended to expand or add any specific types or categories 
of  activities that do not violate the duty of  loyalty without 
the consent of  all partners after full disclosure of  all 
material facts . . . .31  
Thus, for LLC Acts,32 I propose something similar to the following:  
Any limited liability company agreement that provides for 
a modification of  the default rules for what constitutes a 
breach of  duties (including fiduciary duties) of  a member, 
manager or other person to a limited liability company, 
whether to expand, restrict, or eliminate those duties, must 
expressly state if  the modifications are intended to expand, 
restrict, or eliminate the duties.  Any limited liability 
company agreement that allows the modification of  
fiduciary duties must state expressly how those 
modifications can be made and by whom.  Absent such 
any such statement, fiduciary duties may only be modified 
by agreement of  all the members.  
 This could be done prospectively (for all LLC agreements made 
or modified after an effective date), via a phase in, or effective immediately 
for all LLCs.  My view would be to make it prospective, with the 
understanding that prior agreements would be governed by the prior 
intent of  the parties (which is essentially where we are now).  
                                                             
31 Md. Corps. & Ass’ns Code Ann. § 9A-103 (2018). 
32 In Delaware, for example, this could be added to which could be added to Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 6, § 18-110(e).  
